Does 6 million matter statistically

[Nazgul]

Statistical range and resolution limits in WWII mortality estimates

Total mortality estimates for the Second World War are reconstructed ranges derived from incomplete demographic data, post-war population deficits, and indirect attribution methods. Mainstream estimates place total war-related deaths between approximately 69 and 84 million, combining 50–56 million direct military and civilian deaths with 19–28 million deaths from war-related famine and disease. The resulting spread of roughly 15 million deaths reflects structural uncertainty in the source data rather than disagreement over a known total.

Using the midpoint of this range (≈ 76.5 million) implies an absolute uncertainty of approximately ±7.5 million, corresponding to a relative uncertainty of ~20%. This establishes a clear upper bound on numerical precision at the aggregate level.

Within this statistical framework, the citation of a specific figure such as 6 million deaths attributed to any single group has limited analytical meaning when discussed solely in the context of aggregate wartime mortality. This is not a qualitative or moral assessment, but a consequence of statistical resolution. A value of this magnitude lies within the global margin of error of total WWII mortality estimates. When the uncertainty of the measurement system exceeds or approximates the scale of the sub-value being highlighted, that sub-value cannot be independently resolved with high numerical confidence unless supported by separate, high-resolution evidence.

Total wartime mortality is calculated as the sum of multiple components—military losses, civilian deaths, famine, disease, and regional population deficits—each with its own uncertainty. These uncertainties propagate when combined; they do not cancel out. As a result, numerical precision at the sub-category level cannot exceed the precision of the aggregate total without introducing additional independent data sources.

Logistical assumptions further affect uncertainty. Demographic reconstructions commonly assume continuous transport flows and short dwell times. Archival transport records indicating extended stops at railway junctions or labour camps increase variance in time-to-outcome distributions, thereby widening uncertainty rather than narrowing it. This logistical complexity further constrains claims of fine numerical precision.

In summary, WWII mortality figures should be treated as ranges with substantial uncertainty, not fixed values. Within such ranges, isolated numerical claims—such as 6 million deaths attributed to any particular group—have limited explanatory power at the aggregate statistical level unless accompanied by evidence capable of resolving them beyond the existing margin of error. This is a methodological limitation inherent in large-scale historical reconstruction.

While the death of any individual is self-evidently tragic, historical analysis at the scale of global warfare operates under different methodological constraints. Within a dataset whose total mortality range varies by approximately 15 million, the repeated citation of a fixed figure—such as 700,000 deaths attributed to a single location, whether by murder or other causes—has limited analytical value unless the evidentiary basis for that figure can be shown to resolve uncertainty at a finer scale than the aggregate data allow.

This is not a claim that deaths at such a location did not occur, nor a judgment about their nature. It is a statement about confidence in numerical precision. When the background variance of the system exceeds or rivals the magnitude of the sub-figure being asserted, confidence in that figure must necessarily be qualified. Absent independent, high-resolution evidence capable of constraining the estimate beyond the existing margin of error, the number itself cannot be treated as statistically robust.

statistic and death.pdf

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[Hektor]

Statistical range and resolution limits in WWII mortality estimates

Total mortality estimates for the Second World War are reconstructed ranges derived from incomplete demographic data, post-war population deficits, and indirect attribution methods. Mainstream estimates place total war-related deaths between approximately 69 and 84 million, combining 50–56 million direct military and civilian deaths with 19–28 million deaths from war-related famine and disease. The resulting spread of roughly 15 million deaths reflects structural uncertainty in the source data rather than disagreement over a known total.....

a
Yeah war related death... including death not directly caused by physical force. And I would guesstimate the total percentage of death due to secondary causes to be far higher. WW2 caused major economical disruption and Stalin's scorched Earth policy in the East will have starved plenty of people to death... And this on purpose.

[TlsMS93]

a
Yeah war related death... including death not directly caused by physical force. And I would guesstimate the total percentage of death due to secondary causes to be far higher. WW2 caused major economical disruption and Stalin's scorched Earth policy in the East will have starved plenty of people to death... And this on purpose.

Stalin's scorched earth policy amplified a problem that, coupled with Germany's inability to produce sufficient food for itself, generated a tremendous humanitarian crisis that morally weighed heavily on the so-called Hunger Plan.

It is the duty of an occupying country to sustain the occupied population, but this is more of a utopian goal than something tangible. Imagine the US having to occupy the territory of a continental country like Brazil; by calculations, the number of men needed to control the Brazilian population would be unprecedented. Imagine the logistics of sustaining this contingent of millions of men and still managing to feed the population dispersed across millions of square kilometers without local support due to guerrilla warfare and the destruction of productive means during the conflict? Would anyone accuse the Americans of a policy of extermination? The natives perhaps, but to coldly claim that they had a plan with this objective in mind is implausible.

[szlafrok]

"Demographic reconstructions commonly assume continuous transport flows and short dwell times."

I once heard a seasoned railroader remark; "This is a railcar, and mostly what it does is sit."

I'd be curious to know what dwell times historians are assuming for transports? Modern railroads calculate "terminal dwell', which is hours a railcar sits in yards for a given week, but that usually doesn't count time wasted in line of road travel, for example, sitting in a siding en route while passing another train on a single track - that time usually goes to the train velocity metric. Likewise, the time the car spends in local service, or time spent at the customer loading and unloading is accounted for in other metrics, especially if the customer is being charged demurrage.

Here are some stats for a major freight railroad operating in peacetime, in the eastern United States:
https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/customers ... -measures/

I imagine wartime service was vastly slower both for freight and passenger. In wartime accounts it often takes days to reach destinations that are accomplished today in minutes or hours, e.g., Warszawa to Malkinia (the turn off to Treblinka) is about an hour under current passenger service conditions.