Butterfangers wrote:
This is a late response, I started it halfway and saved it as a .txt file, planned to circle back eventually. It's a lazy Sunday, figure might as well.
bombsaway wrote:
It's not a gish gallop on my part (I think you are projecting here), I merely substantiated my statement that within the revisionist frame their lies were incredibly detailed. Look here
Did you even bother to Google what a "Gish gallop" is? You seem confused.
bombsaway wrote:
Sources: F. Hegenscheidt, BdS 'Schwarzes Meer', 28.03.1944 radiogram to Chef der Sipo und des SD and Einsatzgruppe C Lemberg calling the areas of operation of SK 1005a and SK 1005b "precipitation areas" [Niederschlagsgebiete], BArch B162/3537, Bl. 183, 23.11.62, F.H. was aware of a "weather commando" [Wetterkommando] that had to clean up the results of the activities of Sonder- and Einsatzkommandos; E.Hansen, SK 7a member who defected to the Soviets, GARF f. 7021, op. 148, d. 35, ll. 42-53, 14.04.44, reported that "Wettermeldung" was a code word for the incineration of bodies of the people shot in '41-'43 - in his mind the word denoted the process itself, he describes in detail how he also took part in several such actions; W.Piller, SK Legath, SK Bothmann, YVA O.53/12, pp.17ff., 19.05.45, belonged to a "weather commando [Wetterkommando]" headed by Hans Legath, which had to destroy mass graves which were called "weather stations [Wetterstationen]"; L.Wandel, head of Radom Gestapo, BArch B162/3534, Bl. 17, 23.07.45, was asked by KdS Radom about the purpose of a strictly secret telegram called weather report [Wetterbericht], it had to do with graves and actions of certain commandos, also says was a friend of Blobel and learned many details from him; E.Schulz, NO-3841, 20.12.45, in his capacity as Amtschef I des RSHA learned of Blobel's activity: "if I remember correctly, the code name for these mass graves was "water sites [Wasserstellen]""; H. Sohns, organizer of SK 1005a and SK 1005b, BArch B162/3543, Bl. 68, 05.06.62, testified that the number of corpses was coded as cloud height [Wolkenhöhe], op.cit., 3546, Bl. 140, 10.10.66, testified that the reports about exhumations were coded as weather reports [Wettermeldungen], the coding idea stemmed from himself; K. Nicolaus, SK 1005 under KdS Warschau Dr. Hahn, op.cit., Bl. 115, 12.11.63, "the corpses were described as precipitations [Niederschläge]", had to be reported to Dr. Hahn each 10-14 days, telex was then sent to RSHA where "the number of the eliminated corpses was given as an amount of precipitation [Niederschlagsmenge]"; M. Hanisch, SK 1005a, op.cit., 3537, Bl. 65, 13.10.64, reports that in the weather reports [Wetterberichte] the number of incinerated corpses was coded as the cloud height [Wolkenhöhe]; W. Meyer, radio center head at SK7b, cited in Jens Hoffmann, "Das kann man nicht erzählen". "Aktion 1005" - Wie die Nazis die Spuren ihrer Massenmorde in Osteuropa beseitigten, 2008, S. 158, 24.09.67, told how he began getting coded messages with the subject "Re: weather report, cloud height" ["Betr. Wettermeldung, Wolkenhöhe"] with numbers and text, and he was angry about these seemingly useless messages because of the already existing work overload until the actual meaning of the messages (elimination of mass graves) was explained to him.
That's a list of many witness (10 perhaps, I didn't count) testifying to use of weather related coded language to disguise their destruction of mass graves. The first witness here defected to the Soviets in 1944, and testimony was given in West Germany in 1967. You're postulating that essentially the Jews or whoever (on both sides of the iron curtain) instructed these people to include this detail in their testimony, which I find ridiculous (it's inconsequential and unnecessary in terms of establishing guilt or even "badness"), but of course you might subscribe such a thing to the pathological quality of the Jewish mind and so forth.
bombsaway, did you think I didn't see your list of witnesses? Lol, what on earth do you think I was responding to (i.e. why did you feel a need to reproduce it here)? Did you just copy-paste the list in an effort to impress with it's size/quantity, alone? And what is your "pathological quality of the Jewish mind" nonsense? You don't seem to be following our conversation, at least not honestly.
You estimated ten (10) witnesses but did not bother to count. Not to worry, bombsaway, I did it for you. There are actually nine (9) listed there. Let's break them down:
- F. Hegenscheidt - called areas that SK 1005a/b happened to be in "precipitation areas". A photo of the relevant document is available here: https://holocaustcontroversies.blogspot ... s-and.html . Within the document, "precipitation area" appears most likely a reference to "concentration area", given the context of the entire document being solely about deployment, structures of command, and issues with changes in the front line. "Precipitation area" suggests gathering or detention (of people) altogether impacted by the changing dynamics of the war, given no indication of "extermination" whatsoever. "Precipitation" has obvious conceptual similarities to "concentration" (certainly more than it does to "extermination"), making it an ideal word to conceal activity related to Jewish (or other population) movement. Jewish movement was increasingly concealed as they were moved further East, thus minimizing international scrutiny as well as recidivism of Jews back into the West during and after the war. It's worth noting that Hegenscheidt was arrested in Germany in August 1944 under suspicion of treasonous activity, hence any allegations by him are dubious at best. After the war, he was never tried (despite three investigations); he lived a long, healthy life in West Germany until his death in 1985. According to Muehlenkamp, Hegenscheidt was aware of a "weather commando" that had to clean up the results of the activities of Sonder- and Einsatzkommandos. What did this "clean up" look like, according to Muehlenkamp, and when did Hegenscheidt report this? Muehlenkamp's cited document does not mention this.
- E. Hansen - He defected to the Soviets in 1944, and then [according to the Soviets] provided supporting evidence for Soviet narratives. Need I say more?
- W. Piller - Was captured by the Soviets in February 1945, then wrote a "self-written letter of the prisoner of war" while in Soviet captivity, telling of the "Wetterkommando" (this is the reference document Muehlenkamp provides, from the Yad Vashem archive). Again, need I say more? Between Hansen, Piller, and the Soviet Union, we seem to have identified the genesis of the "Wetterkommando" lie.
- L. Wandel - Said he was "a friend of Blobel and learned many details from him", claims [according to Muehlenkamp] a "weather report" actually 'had to do with graves and actions of certain commandos'. Notably, despite being the head of the Gestapo in Radom from March 1941 through December 1944 (where many alleged atrocities occurred), Wandel was -- for undisclosed reasons -- never extradited to Poland (hence, no war crimes trial) and was sentenced to only a few years in a British internment camp before being released. See: https://marjorie-wiki.de/wiki/Lothar_Wandel
- E. Schulz - claimed, "if I remember correctly, the code name for these mass graves was "water sites [Wasserstellen]"". Schulz is an example of, "knew it happened but wasn't involved"; i.e. the only viable defense for any accused. His testimony blamed Friedrich Jeckeln for the immediate extermination order (Jeckeln died before this testimony from Schulz) that was allegedly communicated by Otto Rasch (who was also dead before this testimony from Schulz) and claims it was corroborated by Streckenbach (head of RSHA personnel). Streckenbach reportedly corroborated this claim in his own testimony (per P. Longerich) but somehow Streckenbach evaded trial altogether, living free well-into his 70s, after several years of initial imprisonment by the Soviets and his subsequent release as a German amnesty recipient.
- H. Sohns - Testifies in 1966 (a full two decades after the early Soviet captivity "confessions" from Schulz and Hansen). There is a citation to a Bundesarchiv document by Muehlenkamp but this document requires a physical visit to the archive in Germany and a prior "authorization check". Lol. So much for that [for revisionists].
- K. Nicolaus - Same citation as H. Sohns, above (this time, a 1963 testimony), so... "trust me, bro" again, for now, from Muehlenkamp.
- M. Hanisch - Another Bundesarchiv reference, another "authorization check" and physical visit required. Testimony given in 1964.
- W. Mayer - Mentioned by Mattogno in 'Einsatzgruppen', p. 466-467. In this 1967 testimony (even later in the game), Mayer spoke only of 4-5 ordinary weather reports but 'knew' through a "member of the SK 7b typing pool" (whose name he couldn't recall) that these reports had a different meaning.
There are obviously some gaps in the above due to limited access. But much can be inferred by simply looking at the overall character of the trials.
Adalbert Rueckerl was chief prosecutor in West Germany, he had to say the following in 1971:
It is, therefore, foreseeable that oral proof in Nazi trials will lose in weight more and more rapidly and will sink to the level of insignificance within the foreseeable future.
(Weinschenk, F. (1976). Nazis before German courts: The West German war crimes trials. The International Lawyer, 10(3), p. 522-3)
He predicted that, due to the extremely low quality and integrity of oral testimony surrounding the "Holocaust", such testimony would altogether become obsolete [no longer used]. Boy, was he wrong!
Note also that a whopping 50,000 [once-opened] cases had been "disposed of" by 1976 (op cit, p. 527). But the total number of investigations very much overshadows this figure, given that by 1965, over 60,000 had already been investigated:
On February 26, 1965, the West German Justice Ministry submitted a detailed report on the prosecution of National Socialist crimes to the German Bundestag. The report, which was intended as an intervention in the running debate about statutory limitations for Nazi crimes, depicted German courts, contrary to general opinion, as being actively involved in the investigation of tens of thousands of National Socialist perpetrators. According to the report, a total of 61,761 suspects had been investigated; 6,115 of them had been convicted, and 13,892 were still awaiting trial.
(An Uncompromising Generation: The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main Office, p. 405)
Needless to say, a very "wide net" was being cast. And those being interrogated felt very much a need to say something which could be of use to the interrogators:
Perhaps only in Germany [as opposed to France, Netherlands] can counsel be effective in advising an accused, although even there counsel may not be present at the first crucial interrogations conducted by the police but may only consult with his client beforehand. Thus, especially when being interrogated by police and prosecuting officials, the average suspect is subject to a great deal of pressure, some legal—some not. In addition, it will be made clear to him, whether at the trial or before, that his silence will be unfavorably interpreted.
(Pieck, M. (1962). The accused's privilege against self-incrimination in the civil law. Am. J. Comp. L., 11(4), p. 601)
These above conditions do not happen in a vacuum --
they are within the broader context of the patterns within and between contemporary and preceding postwar trials.
The problem of testimony is acknowledged by establishment historian Hilary Earl, as quoted by Mattogno in 'Einsatzgruppen', p. 81:
After all, criminal trials are adversarial, and testimony is most frequently given in an attempt to establish legal exculpation [or incrimination], not to document historical truth. By their very nature, criminal trials can act as strong impediments to the attainment of historical truth, when by excluding or altering historical facts a defendant can demonstrate innocence or a prosecutor guilt.
Additional problems are described by Mattogno (op cit.):
It should be stressed that all the documents exhibited in these trials were prosecu-
tion documents, since the documents were screened solely for the following pur-
pose (Hofmann, p. 112):
“The Berlin branch staff was divided into different teams; their instructions were
to locate and study all official Nazi records that might contain incriminating in-
formation needed by the twelve new subsequent trials being prepared. The docu-
ments, which were in German, would be summarized in English, and the Staff Evi-
dence Analyses (SEAs) would be distributed to all lawyers in Nuremberg dealing
with related prosecutions. If it was considered very important evidence, the origi-
nal would also be sent.”
This practice inevitably gave rise to a unilateral and tendentious view of the facts
on the one hand, while depriving the defense of true defense documents.
Regarding the [Einsatzgruppen] case under discussion, 30 days before trial, the defense attor-
neys “received copies of every document the prosecution intended to use in evi-
dence. They had ample time to prepare for trial” (ibid., p. 124). Thus, all the doc-
uments available to them were, exclusively and precisely, prosecution documents.
There is additional, relevant criticism of the trials on pages 82-87 as well, for those interested.
Altogether, it became very easy to see how an establishment intent on 'bringing justice to the victims' rather than objectively discovering truth was able to gradually and effectively conjure an inflated and inaccurate portrayal of the role, function, and scale of alleged atrocities. Testimony was meant solely to defend against a totality of prosecution-friendly documents, by any means, which meant deflecting blame for "undeniable" atrocities to other colleagues or superiors, especially those who were already deceased. Such deflection is then improperly documented as an "admission of truth" within the historical record.
One more thing I will add in regard to the West German trials comes from Rudolf in his Foreword to Mattogno's recent, "Mis-Chronicling Auschwitz" (2022). He first explains how a Polish-communist organization setup a proxy organization in Austria (Vienna) to pressure toward the establishment of a major trial in West Germany against former Auschwitz SS. He goes on:
In the toxic, violently anti-German climate in Poland of the immediate
post-war period, the new Polish-Stalinist regime held trials against many
Germans who were accused of all kinds of wartime atrocities. Given all the
circumstances, these trials could not be anything else but Stalinist show trials.
Guilty verdicts were pretty much inevitable, no matter the charges. The West-
German judiciary was well aware of the unreliable nature of these Stalinist
courts’ findings, so no West-German court or prosecutor’s office initially
asked for help by any communist country’s institutions for West-German
criminal investigations against Germans accused of having committed atrocities
during the National-Socialist era. That changed, however, during 1958,
when the International Auschwitz Committee lobbied to open criminal investigations
against Wilhelm Boger, a former employee at the Political Department
of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp. The International Auschwitz
Committee was a Polish-communist propaganda organization established in
1952 with its headquarters in Krakow, but because back then not many in the
West took anything coming from a Polish-communist organization seriously,
they established a General Secretariat in Vienna in neutral Austria. (Tellingly,
its headquarters are now in Berlin.) From Vienna, the communist and Auschwitz
survivor Hermann Langbein spearheaded a campaign launched in 1958 to
initiate a major trial in West Germany against former members of the Auschwitz
Camp’s SS garrison (see Rudolf 2003). It is safe to say that Langbein was
coordinating these attempts closely with his puppet masters in Krakow and
Warsaw.
Once the investigations against Wilhelm Boger were officially opened in
August 1958 – and soon were expanded to include many more defendants –
the Poles set out to prepare a series of documents of grave importance: Danuta
Czech at the Polish Auschwitz Museum used the records available to her to
write a day-by-day account of what the Polish-communist authorities wanted
the world to believe happened in the Auschwitz Camp during the war. She
was to create a streamlined account supporting the findings already “estab-
lished” by the show trials at war’s end, foremost the Krakow Trial against
former Camp Commandant Rudolf Höss, and the Warsaw Trial against other
members of the Auschwitz camp garrison. This streamlined account was published
both in Polish and right away also in a German translation. To do this,
the Auschwitz Museum actually created its own German-language periodical
called Hefte von Auschwitz (see Czech 1959-1962, 1964a&b). While German
as a language was factually, if not legally, banned in all areas under Polish in-
fluence, and while speaking German in Poland in the immediate post-war pe-
riod could spell doom and disaster for the offender, in the midst of all this an-
ti-German frenzy we find the Polish government in conjunction with one of its
museums issuing a German-language periodical. How can we explain that?
The smoking gun clearly points to this project aiming at decisively influ-
encing the expected upcoming Auschwitz Trial soon to be held in West Ger-
many. And indeed, if we read the records of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial,
references to Czech’s Hefte von Auschwitz can be found there, and they even
served as evidence; in fact, Danuta Czech herself appeared as an expert wit-
ness during that trial. But more importantly, it can be assumed that the record
Czech created was used to “instruct” Polish witnesses before traveling west to
testify in Frankfurt, making sure that they all delivered a coherent story in line
with what the Auschwitz Museum’s officials had ordained to be “the truth.”
That this massive manipulation of Polish witnesses happened, indeed, was re-
vealed during the trial itself, as I have reported elsewhere (Rudolf 2019, pp.
110).
The strategy behind this was to force the Stalinist propaganda version of
what happened at Auschwitz (and also elsewhere during other, later trials)
down the West-German judiciary’s throat, establishing it as the only accepta-
ble narrative. Making the West-German judiciary confirm the veracity of the
enormous claims made by Polish historians (with the support or even at the
behest of many Jewish historians, to be sure) would put a gigantic Mark of
Cain onto Germany, an admission of guilt of such preposterous enormity that
anything which happened to Germany and the German population at war’s
end and thereafter could only be seen as a well-deserved punishment for un-
fathomable crimes. It was the continuation of the war by the means of psycho-
logical warfare. It was what the Germans call “Raubsicherungspolitik” – liter-
ally Robbery-Securing Policy, a policy designed to secure the spoils of histo-
ry’s greatest robbery ever, the annexation of East Germany by Poland, and the
ethnic cleansing of its German population.
It worked. The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial proved to be a watershed event
in German history. After it, a deluge of similar trials followed, continuing to
this very day against 100-year-old geriatrics, all following the same script of
the Stalinist show trials of the immediate post-war period.