According to David Irving, the Third Reich had a bunch of nerve gases called Tabun and Sarin that they refused to use during the war.
This steadfast refusal to use poison gas in war is a bit at odds with the holocaust narrative which claims different kinds of gases were used. Nevertheless, it could be argued that for whatever reason, Hitler compartmentalized these two different scenarios in his mind and had a set of justifications in his mind that allowed him to use poison gas in this one area and not in another. Nevertheless, even if it's not a 100% slam dunk argument against the holocaust, I would still say it is evidence against it, even if it doesn't prove the case definitively. Then combine that with the evidence from Hans Frank where he said during the war that they couldn't poison the Jews.
Another issue is why Tabun and Sarin weren't used and instead used CO and Zyklon B. Sarin and Tabun is more deadly. That case has been argued here:
https://codoh.com/library/document/germ ... 1944-2008/
That said, my knowledge of these gases is limited but I can think of some potential responses to this. It may be argued that it would be hard to completely ventilate and it may be dangerous to the perpetrators who used it and the effectiveness of this deadly gas just wouldn't be worth the cost. This seems reasonable to me. If anyone knows more about Tabun and Sarin, I would love to hear their opinion on it and whether this is a reasonable objection.
Third Reich Tabun and Sarin Policy
- Eye of Zyclone
- Posts: 47
- Joined: Fri Apr 04, 2025 3:12 pm
Re: Third Reich Tabun and Sarin Policy
After Zionist propagandists had successufully brainwashed the public in Allied countries with their propaganda story of Jews mass murdered in gas chambers (see the Bergson Group's "We Will Never Die" tour in America), they urged Churchill and Roosevelt to use poison gas against Germany as the Allies had previously promised to do. But Churchill and Roosevelt did nothing because they knew that not a single Jew had been gassed to death anywhere in Germany and German-occupied Europe. Actions speak louder than words...
Peter H. Bergson (real name Hillel Kook) nephew of Ashkenazi chief rabbi of British Mandatory Palestine
Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook, a prominent rabbinical supporter of Zionism
Peter H. Bergson (real name Hillel Kook) nephew of Ashkenazi chief rabbi of British Mandatory Palestine
Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook, a prominent rabbinical supporter of Zionism
Re: Third Reich Tabun and Sarin Policy
Okay, a few points here. Irving in the speech noted above hugely overestimates the importance of Tabun and Sarin nerve gases which the Allies did not know about before their famous victory.
It is true that the Allied gas masks at the time were somewhat inadequate for the new nerve agents, but this would have been rectified very quickly and atropine antidotes and other medicines widely distributed. Both sides were well-equipped for poison gas decontamination, and mustard gas (a persistent blister agent mainly useful for area-denial) was already quite formidable, yet chemical weapons were not considered decisive in battle after much experience with them in World War I. So, unless you were the British who attacked Iraqi camel jockeys in the 1920s from the air, or Italians who famously attacked Ethiopians in the 1930s with mustard gas, the results are going to be disappointing overall.
During WWII, the British at their Porton Down laboratories also weaponized a biological Anthrax weapon, which Churchill wanted to use but never did. It might have been incredibly devastating if used on Germany, which had its medical staff and infrastructure stretched to the limit as well as having shortages of medicines. But would it have won the war? No, not likely.
Yes, the Germans developed these new nerve agents in secret and stockpiled them along with mustard gas. They also developed an even more powerful nerve gas called Soman in 1944, although this was not put into mass-production and stockpiled. Soman was manufactured and stockpiled after the war by the Soviets, however.
After the Second World War, the Americans produced and stockpiled Sarin and also an even more powerful nerve agent that was developed by the British during the Cold War called VX, which the Soviets also developed and stockpiled.
These nerve agents are incredibly powerful, but militaries rarely consider chemical warfare or biological warfare to be decisive, which is the main reason (besides retaliation) that they have only rarely been used after World War I.
This brings me to what is called Strategic Deterrence. Even if you have a new weapon, its usefulness is limited by how the enemy might respond in "payback." How do you know that they don't have something better?
Both sides stockpiled chemical weapons during World War II, but they were never used in the conflict because it could not be decisively argued that they would be operationally decisive or that the enemy would not simply respond in kind. This was Hitler's concern (and his military advisors) mentioned by Goebbels in his memoirs.
The main problem with war gases is that they usually have to be made more "persistent" on the battlefield to be effective for area-denial. Mustard gas from WWI, or Lewisite, a newer "arsenical" blister agent developed by the American Chemical Corps after World War I but never used, are already pretty good at doing just this.
The new German nerve agents, were called the G series after the war: GA (Tabun), GB (Sarin), GD (Soman). There are some others such as GF (or Cyclosarin ─ used by Iraq in the 1980s because it was easier for them to make) than Tabun, Sarin or Soman ─ plus VX nerve agent are all quite powerful, but they usually have to be modified somehow to become more persistent on the battlefield such as by adding wax binders.
A quick search with Mr. Google:
Other poison gases like CO and HCN are called "blood" agents because they effect how oxygen is transported by cells in the bloodstream or aerobic respiration and ATP synthesis on a cellular level, and thus they are very toxic ─ but they are nearly useless gases as weapons on the battlefield since they are extremely non-persistent.
Both Carbon Monoxide (CO) and Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN) gases are lighter than air, although HCN will condense below room temperature and it has a high affinity for water, which means that it washes away easily. CO is odorless and colorless, and HCN nearly so.
However, during bombardments and fires, CO can still be a mass killer in buildings and bunkers ─ and firefighters know that they need special oversized gasmask filters or self-contained breathing apparatus. Also, modern building materials readily produce HCN gas during fires, and this is a well-known factor of toxic smoke for the fire brigades.
So, basically, with most military generals not so very impressed by poison gas widely used during World War I, most countries, including Germany and the United States, signed a treaty banning chemical weapons in 1925. However, along with the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify this treaty, so poison gas remains legal under International Law for the U.S. military to this day. The Germans prepared for chemical defense and decontamination during WWII. And during the Cold War both the Soviet Union and the United States trained for chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBR), now more commonly called Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical defense (NBC).
At the outbreak of World War II, the United States announced that they would have a no-first-use policy regarding chemical weapons.
The fact that Hitler had been a mustard gas casualty near the end of World War I has little or nothing to do with it. Few generals of any belligerent nation were very enthusastic about poison gas simply because it was not very effective or decisive ─ particularly against modern opponents, meaning not camel jockeys or bushmen.
Tear gases and incendiaries like phosphorous bombs and flame throwers are a bit of a gray area since these are technically chemical weapons. Like hollow point or "Dum Dum" bullets, banned by the 1899 Hague Convention for warfare, but readily used by police forces and civilians ─ "riot gases" are not usually used against enemies in warfare, only for police or domestic insurrections.
General MacArthur, for example, used Adamsite, which was a very nasty and sometimes fatal riot gas, against rioting Bonus Army veterans during the Depression in 1932.
This fact that chemical warfare is not very decisive in warfare, despite what David Irving says, and the fact that Strategic Deterrence meant that all of the major players of WWII had extensive chemical stockpiles, plus new secret weapons that were not even known to the enemy like the German nerve gases and the British anthrax, meant that nobody wanted to be the first to test this without knowing that it would be decisive ─ not even the ones who were losing with little left to risk, like the Germans.
Stategic Deterrence is what the Germans were after with their V1 and V2 missile program. The problem is that the Germans could only manufacture about 600 V2 rockets per month (with about 1 ton warheads each) in the later year of the war, even if these missiles could not be intercepted like a conventional bomber attack ─ or the V1 robot bombs, also with similar warheads which were hard but not impossible to intercept ─ was simply not going to make any difference since the Allies were already able to drop thousands of tons of bombs in a single air raid, and with little resistance.
The Germans had already attempted to fight the war with extensive concrete bunkers and tunnels such as at the Mittelwerk V2 factory at Nordhausen, and the Luftwaffe in the latter year of the war which switched nearly its entire aircraft production to fighters for bomber interception.
A more successful example of Strategic Deterrence was the Minuteman missile deployed by the United States in 1961-62. The Minuteman I was a small, solid-fueled intercontinental rocket with four stages that could be stored in silos for a long time without messy and hazardous liquid fuels and it carried an atomic warhead with an explosive yield of over 1 megaton. The Minuteman misile also had an incredible guidance system that featured a digital computer. The V2 rocket had a much less accurate analog computer guidance system.
Working on the Minuteman as an aerospace and nuclear engineer was my Dad's first job out of college, and although he was somewhat anti-military because he had completed the Air Force ROTC program and was nearly conscripted by the Army, he was not selected as an engineer test pilot when the government had put a lot of effort into aerospace technology after Sputnik.
However, my Dad did not regret his years working on the Minuteman and other Defense contracts because it effectively kept the peace since the solid-fuelled rocket could have delivered an impressive "wallop" to the Soviet Union or Red China.
General Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that if the German V-weapons had been concetrated more effectively in key strategic areas, then the Overlord invasion might have had to be written off. The V1 carrying chemical agents like the new German nerve gases might have done that.
But ultimately the German "Payback Weapons" (V-Weapons) and the Luftwaffe were undergunned and could not deliver a sufficent deterrence or "payback." This would not have changed with the addition of poison gases which the Allies had also in massive stockpiles, including biological weapons in the case of the British anthrax bombs.
Finally, why did the Germans not use their secret nerve agents for gassing Jews? Well, first of all, had they been interested in doing this ─ and they weren't ─ these agents are extremely toxic but not particularly well suited for executions unless they wanted to gas people in open areas behind barbed wire or some such thing.
CO and HCN are plenty toxic and far easier to work with. As the Columbia-educated mining engineer and Revisionist Friedrich Paul Berg well noted, pretty much all motor vehicles other than the United States in modern countries during the war were already using mobile wood-gas or coal-gas generators to produce combustible carbon monoxide for motor fuel in order to save gasoline and diesel fuel for higher-priority vehicles. Even the Swedish vacuum cleaner company Electrolux produced mobile CO gas generators for vehicles during the war, and generated CO gas was being used in places like Australia for fumigating jackrabbit warrens in Australia in 1947 using such equipment. These agricultural pests are extremely destructive to crops when they overpopulate.
At the high desert of Mud Lake, Idaho in the Winter of 1981-82, a jackrabbit plague was dealt with by the farmers gathering student volunteers (like me ─ I was there) with iron pipes in hand for a "Bunny Bash" to cull the wascally wabbit herbivorous predators. Yes, this was pretty brutal.
Yes, there were some publicized attempts to build more humane extermination gas-chambers with the exhaust of diesel and gasoline tractors and trucks like in orthodox "Holocaust" lore from the eponymous 1978 NBC TV miniseries, but this was not successful at all. The moral of this story is to have real engineers build your execution equipment, not farmers or police officers, or "corporals with chisels," as I used to say.
Contrary to Prof. Faurisson and Fred Leuchter, who jointly wrote the Leuchter Report, using Zyklon-B for mass murder would not only have NOT been impossible but it would have been pretty easy to do with some simple engineering.
The Germans and Americans and many others were already fumigating entire railroad boxcars in fumigation barns with Zyklon-B insecticide, and this would have been quite feasible if these railroad cars had been filled with deported Jews.
Some of the atrocity claims by storytellers about Zyklon-B are very dumb but building gaschambers is not the problem contrary to Fred Leuchter.
If the Germans could build fumigation cubicles for fumigating clothing, then they could have easily gassed people on a massive scale. See diagram below from a 1937 Degesch handbook. Contrary to people like Leuchter who were out of their technical depth and had to be corrected by people like Fritz Berg and Germar Rudolf, this was not rocket science, folks.
It is true that the Allied gas masks at the time were somewhat inadequate for the new nerve agents, but this would have been rectified very quickly and atropine antidotes and other medicines widely distributed. Both sides were well-equipped for poison gas decontamination, and mustard gas (a persistent blister agent mainly useful for area-denial) was already quite formidable, yet chemical weapons were not considered decisive in battle after much experience with them in World War I. So, unless you were the British who attacked Iraqi camel jockeys in the 1920s from the air, or Italians who famously attacked Ethiopians in the 1930s with mustard gas, the results are going to be disappointing overall.
During WWII, the British at their Porton Down laboratories also weaponized a biological Anthrax weapon, which Churchill wanted to use but never did. It might have been incredibly devastating if used on Germany, which had its medical staff and infrastructure stretched to the limit as well as having shortages of medicines. But would it have won the war? No, not likely.
Yes, the Germans developed these new nerve agents in secret and stockpiled them along with mustard gas. They also developed an even more powerful nerve gas called Soman in 1944, although this was not put into mass-production and stockpiled. Soman was manufactured and stockpiled after the war by the Soviets, however.
After the Second World War, the Americans produced and stockpiled Sarin and also an even more powerful nerve agent that was developed by the British during the Cold War called VX, which the Soviets also developed and stockpiled.
These nerve agents are incredibly powerful, but militaries rarely consider chemical warfare or biological warfare to be decisive, which is the main reason (besides retaliation) that they have only rarely been used after World War I.
This brings me to what is called Strategic Deterrence. Even if you have a new weapon, its usefulness is limited by how the enemy might respond in "payback." How do you know that they don't have something better?
Both sides stockpiled chemical weapons during World War II, but they were never used in the conflict because it could not be decisively argued that they would be operationally decisive or that the enemy would not simply respond in kind. This was Hitler's concern (and his military advisors) mentioned by Goebbels in his memoirs.
The main problem with war gases is that they usually have to be made more "persistent" on the battlefield to be effective for area-denial. Mustard gas from WWI, or Lewisite, a newer "arsenical" blister agent developed by the American Chemical Corps after World War I but never used, are already pretty good at doing just this.
The new German nerve agents, were called the G series after the war: GA (Tabun), GB (Sarin), GD (Soman). There are some others such as GF (or Cyclosarin ─ used by Iraq in the 1980s because it was easier for them to make) than Tabun, Sarin or Soman ─ plus VX nerve agent are all quite powerful, but they usually have to be modified somehow to become more persistent on the battlefield such as by adding wax binders.
A quick search with Mr. Google:
"G agents work by inhibiting acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme responsible for breaking down the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. This leads to a buildup of acetylcholine, which overstimulates nerve receptors and causes a cascade of effects, including muscle spasms, paralysis, and ultimately, respiratory failure and death. [...] These agents were developed during the early to mid-20th century, primarily in Germany, and were intended for military use. Tabun (GA) was the first G agent synthesized. [...] G agents are usually clear, colorless liquids at room temperature. They can be odorless or have a faint odor. [...] Exposure to G agents can cause a range of symptoms, from mild (runny nose, constricted pupils) to severe (breathing problems, seizures, paralysis, and death). [...] Atropine and pralidoxime chloride (2-PAM) are used as antidotes for G agent poisoning."
Other poison gases like CO and HCN are called "blood" agents because they effect how oxygen is transported by cells in the bloodstream or aerobic respiration and ATP synthesis on a cellular level, and thus they are very toxic ─ but they are nearly useless gases as weapons on the battlefield since they are extremely non-persistent.
Both Carbon Monoxide (CO) and Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN) gases are lighter than air, although HCN will condense below room temperature and it has a high affinity for water, which means that it washes away easily. CO is odorless and colorless, and HCN nearly so.
However, during bombardments and fires, CO can still be a mass killer in buildings and bunkers ─ and firefighters know that they need special oversized gasmask filters or self-contained breathing apparatus. Also, modern building materials readily produce HCN gas during fires, and this is a well-known factor of toxic smoke for the fire brigades.
So, basically, with most military generals not so very impressed by poison gas widely used during World War I, most countries, including Germany and the United States, signed a treaty banning chemical weapons in 1925. However, along with the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify this treaty, so poison gas remains legal under International Law for the U.S. military to this day. The Germans prepared for chemical defense and decontamination during WWII. And during the Cold War both the Soviet Union and the United States trained for chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBR), now more commonly called Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical defense (NBC).
At the outbreak of World War II, the United States announced that they would have a no-first-use policy regarding chemical weapons.
The fact that Hitler had been a mustard gas casualty near the end of World War I has little or nothing to do with it. Few generals of any belligerent nation were very enthusastic about poison gas simply because it was not very effective or decisive ─ particularly against modern opponents, meaning not camel jockeys or bushmen.
Tear gases and incendiaries like phosphorous bombs and flame throwers are a bit of a gray area since these are technically chemical weapons. Like hollow point or "Dum Dum" bullets, banned by the 1899 Hague Convention for warfare, but readily used by police forces and civilians ─ "riot gases" are not usually used against enemies in warfare, only for police or domestic insurrections.
General MacArthur, for example, used Adamsite, which was a very nasty and sometimes fatal riot gas, against rioting Bonus Army veterans during the Depression in 1932.
This fact that chemical warfare is not very decisive in warfare, despite what David Irving says, and the fact that Strategic Deterrence meant that all of the major players of WWII had extensive chemical stockpiles, plus new secret weapons that were not even known to the enemy like the German nerve gases and the British anthrax, meant that nobody wanted to be the first to test this without knowing that it would be decisive ─ not even the ones who were losing with little left to risk, like the Germans.
Stategic Deterrence is what the Germans were after with their V1 and V2 missile program. The problem is that the Germans could only manufacture about 600 V2 rockets per month (with about 1 ton warheads each) in the later year of the war, even if these missiles could not be intercepted like a conventional bomber attack ─ or the V1 robot bombs, also with similar warheads which were hard but not impossible to intercept ─ was simply not going to make any difference since the Allies were already able to drop thousands of tons of bombs in a single air raid, and with little resistance.
The Germans had already attempted to fight the war with extensive concrete bunkers and tunnels such as at the Mittelwerk V2 factory at Nordhausen, and the Luftwaffe in the latter year of the war which switched nearly its entire aircraft production to fighters for bomber interception.
A more successful example of Strategic Deterrence was the Minuteman missile deployed by the United States in 1961-62. The Minuteman I was a small, solid-fueled intercontinental rocket with four stages that could be stored in silos for a long time without messy and hazardous liquid fuels and it carried an atomic warhead with an explosive yield of over 1 megaton. The Minuteman misile also had an incredible guidance system that featured a digital computer. The V2 rocket had a much less accurate analog computer guidance system.
Working on the Minuteman as an aerospace and nuclear engineer was my Dad's first job out of college, and although he was somewhat anti-military because he had completed the Air Force ROTC program and was nearly conscripted by the Army, he was not selected as an engineer test pilot when the government had put a lot of effort into aerospace technology after Sputnik.
However, my Dad did not regret his years working on the Minuteman and other Defense contracts because it effectively kept the peace since the solid-fuelled rocket could have delivered an impressive "wallop" to the Soviet Union or Red China.
General Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that if the German V-weapons had been concetrated more effectively in key strategic areas, then the Overlord invasion might have had to be written off. The V1 carrying chemical agents like the new German nerve gases might have done that.
But ultimately the German "Payback Weapons" (V-Weapons) and the Luftwaffe were undergunned and could not deliver a sufficent deterrence or "payback." This would not have changed with the addition of poison gases which the Allies had also in massive stockpiles, including biological weapons in the case of the British anthrax bombs.
Finally, why did the Germans not use their secret nerve agents for gassing Jews? Well, first of all, had they been interested in doing this ─ and they weren't ─ these agents are extremely toxic but not particularly well suited for executions unless they wanted to gas people in open areas behind barbed wire or some such thing.
CO and HCN are plenty toxic and far easier to work with. As the Columbia-educated mining engineer and Revisionist Friedrich Paul Berg well noted, pretty much all motor vehicles other than the United States in modern countries during the war were already using mobile wood-gas or coal-gas generators to produce combustible carbon monoxide for motor fuel in order to save gasoline and diesel fuel for higher-priority vehicles. Even the Swedish vacuum cleaner company Electrolux produced mobile CO gas generators for vehicles during the war, and generated CO gas was being used in places like Australia for fumigating jackrabbit warrens in Australia in 1947 using such equipment. These agricultural pests are extremely destructive to crops when they overpopulate.
At the high desert of Mud Lake, Idaho in the Winter of 1981-82, a jackrabbit plague was dealt with by the farmers gathering student volunteers (like me ─ I was there) with iron pipes in hand for a "Bunny Bash" to cull the wascally wabbit herbivorous predators. Yes, this was pretty brutal.
Yes, there were some publicized attempts to build more humane extermination gas-chambers with the exhaust of diesel and gasoline tractors and trucks like in orthodox "Holocaust" lore from the eponymous 1978 NBC TV miniseries, but this was not successful at all. The moral of this story is to have real engineers build your execution equipment, not farmers or police officers, or "corporals with chisels," as I used to say.
Contrary to Prof. Faurisson and Fred Leuchter, who jointly wrote the Leuchter Report, using Zyklon-B for mass murder would not only have NOT been impossible but it would have been pretty easy to do with some simple engineering.
The Germans and Americans and many others were already fumigating entire railroad boxcars in fumigation barns with Zyklon-B insecticide, and this would have been quite feasible if these railroad cars had been filled with deported Jews.
Some of the atrocity claims by storytellers about Zyklon-B are very dumb but building gaschambers is not the problem contrary to Fred Leuchter.
If the Germans could build fumigation cubicles for fumigating clothing, then they could have easily gassed people on a massive scale. See diagram below from a 1937 Degesch handbook. Contrary to people like Leuchter who were out of their technical depth and had to be corrected by people like Fritz Berg and Germar Rudolf, this was not rocket science, folks.
A young General Napoleon Bonaparte gives the mob a "Whiff of Grapeshot" on the streets of Paris, and that "thing we specifically call French Revolution is blown into space by it."
~ Thomas Carlyle
~ Thomas Carlyle